The Metaxas dictatorship was established on 4 August 1936 when the Greek king, George II, gave General Ioannis Metaxas carte blanche to suspend parliament and rule by decree, in what was widely known as the Fourth of August regime. In spite of its clearly stated ambitions to shape a new Greece for future generations, the dictatorship did not survive the Second World War.
Official tradition has placed Metaxas in the pantheon of national heroes because of his refusal to accept Mussolini's ultimatum on 28 October 1940 and because the Greek army successfully repelled the Italian attack. Nowadays 28 October is celebrated as a public holiday in Greece ('No' day). His decision placed Greece on the side of the Allies and allowed Metaxas to claim it was the Greek army that caused the first major setback to the otherwise seemingly invincible Axis powers during the winter of 1940-41. Despite the fact Metaxas died before Hitler invaded Greece on 6 April 1941, with the passage of time his firm refusal to accede to Mussolini's demands has come to be regarded as defiance of Germany and the fascist bloc as a whole.
For this reason the task of many post-war narratives of the Metaxas regime was to reconcile its obvious dictatorial nature with the Allied cause.
1 Already here one would expect to find a tendency attempting to downgrade the more unsavoury aspects of the regime, not least its fascist ones. While there are reasons to be sceptical about claims he was a fascist -for example, because the regime was not born of a right-wing revolutionary movement with mass participation -it is an irrefutable fact that many of its symbols and some of the institutions it created were clearly inspired by the Fascist and Nazi movements.
Furthermore, there are numerous previously secret contemporary German accounts produced by diplomats, politicians and military institutions that state Metaxas wanted to do what Germany had already done. There are also reports from the American ambassador to Greece, who believed the British must have been blind not to see Metaxas was moving the regime in a fascist direction and that Greece was moving closer to Germany. All of this implies the existence of a strong transformative potential on the part of the regime, and it makes clear that contemporary observers believed it had long-term intentions for change. Because this potential was never fully realised it is even more important to investigate, as Aristotle Kallis suggests, whether the political consolidation of the Metaxas regime can be categorized as the Greek chapter of a much wider narrative of transformation and radicalization in content and in the context of the anti-democratic, anti-liberal and anti-communist politics of the inter-war years.
3
In this chapter we will investigate the various stages of the regime's development, the main parameters of which are changes to the internal balance of power between Metaxas and the king, and the impact on Greece of changes to the European political order -changes that affected the entire continent in the wake of Germany's revisionist drive during the second half of the 1930s.
Metaxas' path to power
While anti-democratic, anti-liberal and anti-communist politics all figured on his political agenda at one time or another, in many important respects Metaxas' path to power was conditioned by events beyond his control and, it is important to note, there was no fascist movement of any political or social significance in inter-war Greece.
In 1936, when his political career began to take off in earnest, Metaxas belonged to the political elite -but only as a marginal figure in the antiVenizelist camp, the popular right-wing of inter-war Greek politics. The origin of this term originates from a cleavage in the political elite surrounding Greece's participation in the First World War, which became pivotal in shaping Greek politics in the ensuing years. On one side of this split, known in Greece as the National Schism, was the leader of the Liberal Party, Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who wanted Greece to enter the war on the side of the Entente; he was opposed by King Constantine I and his followers, who wished Greece to remain neutral. The king was accused of being pro-German because of his family ties to the Kaiser, but his official arguments were that if Greece declared war against Germany it would risk losing its newly conquered northern provinces of Macedonia and Thrace to Germany's ally, Bulgaria.
